While intentionality and phenomenal consciousness were traditionally conceived as the two most central dimensions of the mind, they were almost always treated independently. Over the past decade, however, several philosophers have attempted to account for consciousness in terms of intentionality. More recently, a view has developed according to which intentionality is itself somehow dependent on consciousness. On this view, the intentionality of unconscious intentional states is merely derivative of, or otherwise dependent upon, the intentionality of phenomenally conscious states. This issue of The Monist will explore the question of the relationship between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. In particular, we are interested in (i) whether phenomenally conscious states have a form of intentionality or of intentional content that is distinctive or sui generis, and (ii) whether the intentionality of conscious states enjoys some kind of primacy over other forms of intentionality. Other questions to be addressed include: Are phenomenally conscious states inherently intentional? Is the intentionality of phenomenally conscious states - or ‘phenomenal intentionality’ - different from the intentionality of other mental and non-mental representations? If so, what are its distinctive characteristics?
Table of Contents:
Amie L. Thomasson
Phenomenal Consciousness and the Phenomenal World
Joseph Levine
Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet
Colin McGinn
Consciousness as Knowingness
Adam Pautz
The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality
Katalin Farkas
Phenomenal Intentionality without Compromise
Itay Shani
Against Consciousness Chauvinism
James Tartaglia
Intentionality, Consciousness, and the Mark of the Mental: Rorty’s Challenge
Terry Horgan and Uriah Kriegel
Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind