88:4 October 2005
Ordinary Objects 

Advisory Editor: Laurie Paul, University of Arizona

Ordinary objects such as apples, statues and cats can be understood philosophically in different ways: as bundles of properties, as Aristotelian substances, as substrates having attributes, or as hunks of matter. There are familiar puzzles associated with each of these alternative conceptions. Consider: Is my apple identical to the matter it is made of? My apple could not, after all, survive being squashed, yet its matter could. This difference in modal properties suggests that the apple and its matter are not identical. Some have suggested that the matter constitutes, but is not identical to, the apple. But what, then, is the apple? If it is merely a bundle of properties, does it have all its properties essentially? And if so, then how does this square with the common-sense opinion that the apple could have had a slightly different color or shape? And if the apple is a bundle of properties or a substrate that has properties, then are these properties themselves universals, or tropes, or something else? Perhaps we must find out what concept my apple falls under before these questions can be answered. But would then our concept of the apple determine what the apple is? Or would the apple still exist independently of whatever concepts we apply to it?

Papers are invited on the metaphysics of objects which provide an analysis of what objects such as apples, statues and cats are in a way which will yield solutions to problems of these sorts, including problems concerning material constitution, the identity of indiscernibles, essentialism, and the role of ordinary objects in cognition.

Table of Contents:

Frank Arntzenius and John Hawthorne 

Gunk and Continuous Variation

David Robb

Qualitative Unity and the Bundle Theory

John Heil

What is a Table?

E. J. Lowe

How are Ordinary Objects Possible?

M. Ayers

Ordinary Objects, Ordinary Language and Identity

R. Casati

Common Sense, Philosophical and Theoretical Notions of an Object: Some Methodological Problems

M. Heller

Anti-Essentialism and Counterpart Theory