87: 2 April 2004
Self-Consciousness 

Advisory Editor: José Luis Bermúdez, Stirling

We are conscious of ourselves in a distinctively first-personal way. What is the source of this distinctive type of self-consciousness? Is it grounded in a particular type of awareness of an object that is the self? If so, is this awareness best viewed as a form of inner perception or as a matter of propositional attitudes? Is it conceptual or non-conceptual? Is it unique to language-using humans or can it be found more widely in the animal kingdom? Contributions are solicited on these and related topics, including: the relation between self-consciousness and mastery of the first-person pronoun; comparisons between the different sources of self-consciousness (memory, introspection, proprioception etc); the relation between theories of self-consciousness and theories of consciousness; the functional role of self-consciousness; the significance of sources of self-specifying information with certain formal properties such as immunity to error through misidentification or representation-independence.

Table of Contents:

Being Conscious of Ourselves

David M. Rosenthal

Consciousness and Self-Consciousness

Uriah Kriegel

Knowing the Reference of the First Person Pronoun

John Campbell

Self-Consciousness and the Unity of Consciousness

Tim Bayne

Inverted First-Person Authority

Colin McGinn

Introspection, Perception, and Epistemic Privilege: Response to McGinn

Quassim Cassam

Skepticism, Deflation and the Rediscovery of the Self

Stephen L. White