Deadline for submissions is one year before the publication dates below.
Intending authors should directly contact the Advisory Editor(s) listed for the relevant issue. They should refer to the submission guidelines when preparing their work for submission.
Publication Date: Issue Title (click title for description)
101:4 Oct. 2018.
Advisory Editor: A.W Carus (email@example.com).
Deadline for submissions: Oct 31, 2017
It is well known that Carnap, in his “Overcoming of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language” of 1932, used Heidegger’s philosophy to provide examples of metaphysical pseudosentences. What is less well known is that Carnaps’s critique of metaphysics was rooted in a broader, positive metaphilosophy, which underwent a radical change in the early 1930s that gave rise to the principle of tolerance, the basis for Carnap’s later outlook. The earlier critique of metaphysics thereby yielded to a different kind of critique, with a focus on replacing “external” questions — questions not articulable in an explicitly specified linguistic framework — by practical questions concerning which framework to choose. Papers are invited that address not only Carnap’s own metaphilosophy, but also the status of present-day metaphysics in the light of Carnap’s critique — including such questions as: Must the later, tolerance-oriented metaphilosophy actually exclude metaphysics? And if not, which forms of metaphysics will remain safe? Does the later critique apply, for instance, to current analytic metaphysics? And how does it relate to current work under the heading of ‘metametaphysics’? These are not just historical questions, but also address issues of importance to many aspects of current philosophy.
101:3 Jul 2018.
Advisory Editors: Tiziana Andina (firstname.lastname@example.org), Carola Barbero (email@example.com), and Carolyn Korsmeyer (firstname.lastname@example.org).
Deadline for submissions: July 31, 2017
Food is normally considered as something natural, but there are good reasons to consider it also as belonging to the realm of artifacts and sometimes even as rising to the level of works of art. Food contributes to building that part of our human identity that has to do with culture and tradition and with social standing. Our relationship with food can be healthy, but it can also take on the form of a disease. In this issue of The Monist, philosophers and representatives of disciplines such as psychology, economics, sociology, and medicine will attempt to investigate the role and value of food in our lives. What kind of object is food? How are we to classify it in our ontology? What are its functions in our lives?
101:2 Apr 2018.
Advisory Editor: Leo Zaibert (email@example.com).
Deadline for submissions: April 30, 2017
Think of the action of a political leader in approving torture when confronted by a terrorist threat. According to some, such an action – a case of what in the literature is called “dirty hands” – would be simultaneously both right and wrong. According to others, however, such dirty hands cases cannot exist. For while it is easy to see how actions can be right in some respects and wrong in others, or right in some contexts but wrong in others, dirty hands cases are held to be both right and wrong simpliciter, and this is logically impossible. The present issue of The Monist is devoted to papers addressing the apparent paradox of dirty hands. Are dirty hands cases linked specifically to political activity? Are they linked essentially to emergencies? Or can dirty hands cases arise in the normal course of our lives? Is Melville’s Billy Budd, for example, a story about dirty hands? And how are actors with dirty hands to be treated – should they be simultaneously both praised and blamed?
101:1 Jan 2018.
Advisory Editor: John Haldane (firstname.lastname@example.org).
Deadline for submissions: Jan 31, 2017
Historically aesthetics has focussed on the philosophy of art, on the nature of beauty, and on the character of the experience of both. This tended to represent the aesthetic as somewhat rare and elevated above ordinary experience and practice. In recent decades the subject has broadened with attention being given to a wider diversity of art forms including conceptual art and land art, computer art, the cinema, and video arts. In addition there has been a growth of interest in environmental aesthetics. A more limited development has been the recognition of the ubiquity of the aesthetic within the fabric of everyday life as for example in work on the aesthetics of the built environment, of personal spaces, and on the aesthetic aspects of social life. Papers are invited that explore either the general idea of an aesthetics of everyday life, or particular topics within this general area. Of particular interest are papers relating the aesthetics of everyday life to issues in social relationships and public policy, for example in relation to clothing styles and fashion, public rituals and ceremonies, landscape design and gardening, urban planning, ambient sound, and graffiti.
100:4 Oct 2017.
Advisory Editor: Werner Ceusters (Buffalo) (email@example.com).
Deadline for submissions: Oct 31, 2016
A pain is defined by the International Association for the Study of Pain as ‘an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage’. Contributions are invited that might help to improve this definition, addressing questions such as: What sorts of entities are pains? Do pains involve two kinds of experiences, sensory on the one hand and emotional on the other? If somebody has a painful toe, is the pain located in the toe or in the brain? Is pain essentially associated with (actual or possible) tissue damage—so that one should not strictly speaking speak of pain in the case of, for example, response to bereavement? Papers are particularly welcomed which address the significance of recent developments in neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, and biomedicine for the philosophical understanding of pain.
Kant argued that the laws of nature were, in part, the result of our mind projecting an order onto nature. This issue of The Monist seeks to assess the prospects of such a conception of laws for contemporary debates in the philosophy of science. We invite contributions addressing questions such as: How is ‘projecting an order onto nature’ properly to be understood? What good can a conception of laws in these terms be for on-going debates between realist and empiricist approaches to laws of nature? Can a Kantian view shed light on the foundations of modern physics (and especially on quantum mechanics) or on contested issues concerning the nature of laws in biology; and might such a view advance current debates over the unity or disunity of science?
April 2017: TBA
100:1 January 2017.
Advisory Editor: Uriah Kriegl, Univ. of Arizona (firstname.lastname@example.org).
Deadline for submissions: January 31, 2016
Franz Brentano is familiar to analytic philosophers primarily for his reintroduction of the notion of intentionality into modern philosophy. But Brentano was a systematic thinker who made original contributions also in other areas of the philosophy of mind, as well as in metaphysics, metaethics, and epistemology. This issue of The Monist, to be published on the centennial of Brentano’s death, will focus on Brentano’s relevance to contemporary debates throughout philosophy. Contributions are invited addressing questions such as: Can Brentano’s mereology or reism contribute to current metaphysical debates? Can his theory of intrinsic value inform modern metaethics? Can his particular brand of foundationalism contribute to current discussions of epistemic justification?
99:4 October 2016.
Advisory Editor: Francis Cheneval (email@example.com) and Martin Beckstein (firstname.lastname@example.org), University of Zurich.
Deadline for submissions: October 31, 2015
We invite contributions that attempt to address from a philosophical point of view questions such as the following:
− What are the core values of conservatism?
− What is specific about conservatism?
− What are the philosophical justifications of conservatism and what philosophical problems does it raise?
− What challenges does conservatism pose to other schools of thought, such as liberalism or communitarianism?
− Does conservatism provide a distinctive approach to current political concerns, for instance environmentalism?
− What does philosophical conservatism add to recent discussions about realism in political theory?
This issue of The Monist addresses the relations between the debate on scientific models in philosophy of science and the debate on the nature of fiction in aesthetics. Although a precursor of the analogy between models and fiction can be identified in Vaihinger’s emphasis on the importance of fictions for scientific reasoning, only very recently have philosophers of science such as Roman Frigg and Peter Godfrey-Smith tried to articulate this analogy by drawing on accounts of fiction from aesthetics. Contributions are invited addressing questions such as: How should we construe the analogy between models and fiction? Is there an analogue in our engagement with scientific models of the sort of imagination traditionally associated with our engagement with fiction? Is there an analogy between the ways we learn from fictions and the ways we learn through use of scientific models? On what basis are claims about a model qualified as true or false? Is there an analogy between truth in a model and truth in fiction? Do such analogies throw light on the distinction between truth in fiction and genuine truth?
99:2 April 2016
Advisory Editor: Mark Alfano, Princeton University (email@example.com)
Deadline for submissions: July 31, 2015
Some virtues, like courage and temperance, have been part of the philosophical tradition since its inception. Others, like filial piety and female chastity, have gone out of style. Still others, like curiosity and aesthetic good taste, are upstarts. What, if anything, can be said in general about this motley collection? Are they all dispositions to respond to reasons? Do they share characteristic components, such as affect, emotion, and trust? Are they organized into a cardinal hierarchy, or is it better to investigate them one by one, developing a comprehensive but unstructured catalogue? What would constitute an empirical test of the degree to which a given virtue is realized, and – to the extent that such tests have been conducted – what is their philosophical upshot? Contributions from various perspectives, including perspectives underrepresented in this context (experimental, feminist, Humean, pragmatist, phenomenological, etc.), are invited to address these and related questions.
99:1 Jan 2016.
Advisory Editor: Asa Kasher, Tel Aviv University (firstname.lastname@example.org).
Deadline for submissions: April 31, 2015
Philosophical discussions of war and of other kinds of violent engagement have thus far been confined almost exclusively to military ethics and political philosophy. The purpose of this issue of The Monist is to show how other branches of philosophy may shed light on aspects of war and violence, for example:
− Philosophy of language: How is the term ‘war’ being used in expressions such as ‘war on drugs’, ‘war on terror’, and so on?
− Philosophy of art: Are the ‘martial arts’ or the ‘art of war’ genuine arts on the institutional or any other theory of art?
− Philosophy of action: Are there special types of action which are necessary for an event to be a military engagement? How are military actions related to other kinds of violent actions, for example in the pursuit of crime or terrorism?
− Philosophy of law: In what sense are ‘martial law’ or the ‘law of armed conflict’ properly to be counted as systems of law?
− Philosophy of peace: Do war and peace constitute a strict dichotomy or something like a continuum between two idealized poles? Are there good reasons for pursuing a state that is closer to peace than to war?
− Philosophy of computing: In what sense is ‘cyberwarfare’ a kind of war?
98:4 Oct 2015.
Advisory Editor: Patti Tamara Lenard (email@example.com).
Deadline for submissions: Jan 31, 2015
The role of trust in democracies is typically taken for granted: democracies are successful if and only if they are underpinned by widespread trust relations among their citizens. When citizens trust each other, and when they trust their political leaders, citizens will voluntarily comply with the rules and regulations that govern their lives; in other words, they will cooperate to bring about the benefits typically attributed to living under democratic rule. One measure of widespread trust is the willingness of citizens to participate in civil society organizations where they learn to cooperate and therefore to trust others. This special issue of The Monist will focus on the relationship between trust and democracy, for example as outlined by scholars such as Robert Putnam, Pierre Rosanvallon, and Mark Warren. Contributors are asked to focus on questions including but not limited to the following: Is trust essential to democracy? Is trust the right concept with which to explain effective democratic performance, or are other factors (for example, social capital) better suited to do so? How does trust enable democracy to function?
A primary and enduring concern of metaphysics is the question of the categories, or principal divisions of being. In proposing a theory of categories, ontologists face several interconnected problems. What are categories? Are they genera, classes, concepts, or words? What categories are there and how is a proposed theory or table of categories justified? Is it by logic, by linguistics, by science, by intuition, or by common sense? Are categories immutable, or do they evolve through time? What form should a theory or table of categories take, and how should its completeness be demonstrated? How, finally, do theories of categories function in application: in science, in language, in ontology, and in technology?
Both in the Continental and in the analytic world, philosophical realism is becoming ever more fashionable. On the Continental side, the experience of the post-9/11 wars and of recent economic crises has led to a harsh denial of two central tenets of postmodernism, both held, for example, by Foucault, Vattimo, and Rorty: (1) that reality is socially constructed and infinitely malleable, and (2) that ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’ represent useless notions. Facts cannot be reduced to interpretations, as even Derrida (in his final years) and more recently Latour, have recognized. On the analytic side, too, the situation is very different from what it was in the heyday of Feyerabend, Goodman, Davidson, Kuhn, Dummett, van Fraassen, and Hacking – as is shown by the growth of analytical metaphysics and of alternatives to anti-realism in semantics and philosophy of science. Now, however, philosophy is polarized between the (mostly analytic) view according to which only natural science can tell us what really exists and another (mostly Continental) view according to which only an anti-naturalistic stance can do justice to socio-political phenomena. The challenge, then, is this: can a New Realism be developed that can do justice both to the scientific worldview and to the phenomena of value, norms, politics, and religion. Papers are invited which rise to this challenge.